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‘The Only Creature God Willed For Its Own Sake’: 






The Second Vatican Council’s constitution Gaudium et Spes stated that man is ‘the only creature on 
earth that God has willed for its own sake’.  Post-conciliar Catholic teaching on the environment largely 
reproduced this anthropocentric theology.  Pope Francis’ encyclical letter Laudato Si’, however, 
appears directly to contradict this well-established tradition with its repeated assertions of the 
intrinsic value of nonhuman life and its critical approach to the term ‘anthropocentrism’.   
Questioning this putative discontinuity, this article challenges the perception that Laudato Si’ has 
definitively rejected anthropocentrism.   It suggests that the claim for the intrinsic value of nonhuman 
life, and the traditional assertion that man is the only creature willed for its own sake, can be seen to 
converge in light of the traditional theological anthropology of the human being as microcosm.  On 
this view, the centrality of the human person in the order of creation is constituted by its gathering up 
of the sakes of creatures.  The distinctive place of the human does not come at the expense of the rest 
of creation, but rather is the means of creation’s movement towards the unity and harmony to which 
God calls it.  Laudato Si’ is distinguished not by its rejection of anthropocentrism, but by its refusal to 
set human and nonhuman over against one another.  In contrast, the language of ‘intrinsic value’ is 
criticised for conceiving created value as a zero-sum game, as though human and nonhuman value are 
in competition with one another; the language of ‘stewardship’ is criticised for its extrinsicist 





In 1897 the Catholic Dictionary asserted that  
 
Animals have no rights.  The brutes are made for man who has the same 
right over them which he has over plants and stones... [it is] lawful to put 
them to death, or to inflict pain on them, for any good or reasonable end ... 
even for the purpose of recreation.1 
 
In saying this, it was in keeping with the trend set by Pope Pius IX, who refused the foundation 
of an animal welfare charity in Rome on the grounds that human beings have no duties 
towards animals.2  Neither the dictionary nor Pius IX’s decision possess any teaching authority 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Andrew Linzey, Animal Rites (London: SCM, 1976), 20. 
2 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (London: SCM, 1994), 19. 
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for Catholics.  Nevertheless, it is no surprise that the promulgation of Laudato Si’ in 2015 was 
hailed as a revolution in Catholic teaching on these issues. 
 
In what follows, I begin by probing and attempting to resolve a seemingly inner-Catholic 
difficulty―an apparent (and serious) inconsistency in the magisterial tradition―in order to 
address an issue of universal significance to Christian theology and practice: the place and 
status of human beings in the natural order.  There are a number advantages to this method.  
Firstly, it takes seriously the specificity of Christian theological traditions.  Secondly, the 
Catholic magisterium represents itself (rightly or wrongly) as a defined body of authoritative 
teaching developing self-consistently through time.3  This makes it useful lens through which 
to identify and assess changing Christian sensibilities.  It forces the scholar into a particularly 
stringent answerability to history and precedent, at the same time as allowing her to subject 
the tradition to a sort of stress-test in a rather precise way.  Thirdly, the force and fertility of 
the position I seek ultimately to defend emerges with special clarity from the theological 
parameters Catholic teaching has generated during the past century.  Finally, it provides an 
opportunity to show that granting authority to the tradition need not function to undercut 
the momentum of present-day urgencies and perspectives, but can deepen and illuminate 
them; and conversely, that to take seriously the concerns of the present can illuminate new 
or previously unappreciated dimensions of what has been taught before. 
 
So, while the paper opens with what may seem to some to be a rather nit-picking sort of 
Catholic housekeeping, its end-point is the exploration of a fresh perspective on one of the 
most sensitive and pivotal terms in contemporary Christian engagement with environmental 
change: ‘anthropocentrism’.  It is hoped that the argument which unfolds will be seen to have 
application and utility across Christian households.  While arriving at this argument is the real 
point of the paper, it is hoped that readers gain something from the method by which it is 
arrived at: a careful attention to the domestic hygiene of one Christian tradition. 
 
I.a) The Hermeneutic of Discontinuity in Catholic Environmental Teaching 
 
In the contest over the interpretation of Vatican II, there is a phrase which has come to 
crystallise the divergence in the debate: ‘the hermeneutic of continuity’.  Benedict XVI used 
it to express the difference between those who presume a rupture between the pre- and 
                                                          
3 The word ‘magisterium’ in Roman Catholic usage refers simply to the Church’s authoritative teaching office.  
The boundaries of this office and the manner of its correct exercise have been subject to considerable debate in 
the modern period.  For two slightly different approaches, see Avery Dulles, Magisterium: Teacher and Guardian 
of the Faith (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2013) and Francis O’Sullivan, Magisterium: 
Teaching Authority in the Catholic Church (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002).  My use of the term ‘magisterium’ 
in this article is not meant to short-circuit these debates; it functions simply as necessary shorthand, given the 
demands of a single paper, for ‘the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching office’.  Notably, the self-consistency of the 
magisterium only precludes significant change in, or reversal of, irreformable teaching.  Pope Francis’ change of 
the magisterial position on the death penalty is an example of modification of reformable teaching. 
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post-conciliar church, and those who presume the continuity of the tradition and make that 
assumption the hermeneutic principle for interpreting the Council.  Without implying any 
commentary on that debate, this paper explores a structurally similar issue in relation to 
contemporary Catholic teaching on ecology and environment.4  The putative discontinuity is 
usually expressed with the claim that Catholic teaching at last rejects ‘anthropocentrism’,5 
and the celebration of the development, in the pontificate of Pope Francis, of a language 
expressing the ‘intrinsic value’ of nonhuman life.6   
 
Laudato Si’s apparent critique of anthropocentrism accords with the pillorying of that term 
by those working on environmental issues.  Theologians working in this field ‘take it for 
granted that [anthropocentrism] is a problem.’7  The view that anthropocentrism is a 
‘significant’ obstacle to environmental responsibility commands energetic assent from voices 
from across the theological spectrum.8  Given this, it is no surprise that there has been such 
widespread celebration of Francis’ change of rhetoric.  One commentator describes Laudato 
Si’ as ‘the most important text written about animal concern since Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation.’9    
 
While this reception is understandable, it needs to be complemented by a certain 
circumspection; an attempt to make sense of this seeming innovation in the light of 
apparently contradictory magisterial teaching.10   Only six years prior to the promulgation of 
                                                          
4 Secular commentators especially tend to ‘read [Francis’] ascendency to Pope through the eyes of a 
discontinuity and “pray” for his courage to continue breaking from the past’ (Trevor Thompson, ‘Probing Laudato 
Si’ for a New Spirituality in a Technocratic Culture’ (PhD Thesis, Duke University, 2017), 57.   
5 E.g. Bronislaw Szerszynski, ‘Praise Be To You, Earth-Beings’ (Environmental Humanities 8.2 (2016): 291-297), 
who says that in Laudato Si’ ‘[n]ew or freshly reconfigured entities [now] enter the formal teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church’, including ‘the agency and subjectivity of the nonhuman world as worthy of our respect’ 
(292).  ‘Both Francises, the saint and the pope, are anti-anthropocentric when compared with the theological 
mainstream against which they define themselves’ (295); ‘he seeks to hail into being a new geo-spiritual 
formation through which new, contentious objects can enter politics’ (296). 
6 Michael Northcott, for example, celebrates Pope Francis’ teaching that nonhuman life cannot be reduced to a 
merely instrumental value, in contrast to a theological tradition which reserved intrinsic value to human beings, 
as in Thomas Aquinas (‘Economic Magical Thinking and the Divine Ecology of Love’, Environmental Humanities 
8.2 (2016): 263-269, 266).  Denis Edwards makes a similar contrast: ‘It offers…at least in Catholic Church 
teaching, [a] new theological view of the natural world, of animals, plants, mountains, rivers, seas’, which 
Edwards connects to three distinct emphases: ‘the value of nonhuman creatures in themselves before God, the 
concept of other creatures as revelatory of God, and the theology of the sublime communion of creation’ (‘The 
Theology of the Natural World in Laudato Si’’ (Environmental Humanities 8:2 (2016): 378-391, 380; cf. Denis 
Edwards, ‘“Sublime Communion”: The Theology of the Natural World in Laudato Si’’, Theological Studies 77.2 
(2016): 377 –391). 
7 John O’Keefe, ‘Pope Benedict’s Anthropocentrism: Is It A Deal-Breaker?’, Journal of Religion and Society 9 
(2013): 85-93, 88. 
8 O’Keefe, ‘Anthropocentrism’, 85. 
9 Charles Camosy, ‘Three Hopeful Signs, Three Missed Opportunities’, ‘Catholic Moral Theology’, 24th June 2015 
(https://catholicmoraltheology.com/laudato-si-on-non-human-animals-three-hopeful-signs-three-missed-
opportunities/, accessed 16th November 2018). 
10 I offer here no defence of a hermeneutic of continuity per se, except the rather anodyne point that if we 
celebrate the authority of the Franciscan magisterium, it is strange to pay no heed to the pre-Franciscan 
magisterium on which it builds.   
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Laudato Si’, Benedict XVI warned against any revision to the Church’s traditional attribution 
of superiority to human beings in the order of creation: ‘in the name of a supposedly 
egalitarian vision of the “dignity” of all living creatures, such notions end up abolishing the 
distinctiveness and superior role of human beings’.11    This paper examines the putative 
discontinuity by confronting Laudato Si’ with a teaching which prima facie denies its 
perspective.  The Second Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World, Gaudium et Spes, states that ‘man… is the only creature God willed for its own sake’ 
(GS 24.3).12  Being conciliar, this teaching possesses the highest authority,13 and is repeated 
twice in the Catechism.14  It gained particular prominence during the pontificate of John Paul 
II, for whom GS 24.3 ‘can be said to sum up the whole of Christian anthropology’.15  It would 
be hard to overstate, says one commentator, the importance of this text for the interpretation 
of the Council that John Paul pursued.16   
 
If GS 24.3 is considered in the context of environmental ethics, it can be seen as speaking to 
the question of theological rationale or motivation; as offering an answer to the question of 
why I should bother acting in defence of nature.  For whose sake is environmental action 
urged?  For a thing to have a ‘sake’ suggests that the thing is for-itself and not for-another; 
that it is morally considerable, a worthy object of moral action in its own right.  It maps broadly 
onto the Kantian distinction, popular in modern ethics, between intrinsic and instrumental 
value.  GS 24.3 appears to deny an intrinsic value to nonhuman creatures, and so to 
corroborate a sentiment of disregard for nonhuman life, and the belief in human superiority 
over nature that has been widely deplored as the cause of the ecological crisis.17   
 
                                                          
11 Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 2010, para. 13. 
12 Quoted from Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd Edition (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2016), which cites 
Gaudium et Spes 24.3 in paras. 356 and 1703. This wording differs slightly from the translation given in the 
authorised English version available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/ 
documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html (accessed 28th November 2018), which has ‘…the 
only creature which God has willed for itself’.  In this article I will prefer the Catechism’s translation as more 
naturally expressing in English the force of the Latin: ‘qui in terris sola creatura est quam Deus propter seipsam 
voluerit’. 
13 While Popes can unilaterally declare infallible dogma, the college of bishops acting in union with the Pope, as 
in an ecumenical council, represents a fuller exercise of the magisterium than a Pope’s teaching encyclical (see 
e.g. Dulles, Magisterium).  On this model, Gaudium et Spes is more authoritative than Laudato Si’. 
14 Catechism of the Catholic Church, paras. 356, 1703. 
15 John Paul II, Dominum et Vivificantem (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1986), para. 59.  The full verse of GS 
24.3, in the authorised English version, reads: ‘This likeness [between the communion of the divine persons and 
human communion] reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully 
find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.’  The character of ‘man’ as the only creature willed for its 
own sake is linked specifically to man’s vocation to ‘make a sincere gift of himself’ and in so doing to ‘find himself’.  
We return to this important specification below. 
16 Douglas Bushman, ‘Pope John Paul II and the Christ-centered Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes’, Ignatius 
Insight 2008 (http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2008/print2008/dbushman_gaudiumetspes_jan08. html, 
accessed 16th November 2018).   
17 For a review of the literature on this 50 years after Lynn White’s opening salvo, see Willis Jenkins, ‘After Lynn 
White: Religious Ethics and Environmental Problems’, Journal of Religious Ethics 37.2 (2009): 283–309. 
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The increasing prominence of environmental ethics in Catholic Social Teaching makes it 
appropriate to frame the putative discontinuity generated by Laudato Si’ in these terms of 
‘rationale’.  What sort of moral reasoning should drive environmental concern?  Why should 
I care about creation?  For the sake of humanity?  Or for its own sake?  The pre-Franciscan 
magisterium expresses the logic of GS 24.3 in invoking a bluntly anthropocentric rationale.18  
The natural world is to be protected for the sake of human beings.  The thrust of the language 
of Laudato Si’, in contrast, is that nonhuman creation should be protected for its own sake.  
Indeed, in the Franciscan magisterium the term ‘anthropocentrism’ is used in a purely 
negative manner.   
 
Inn what follows, I test the integrity of the Catholic magisterial tradition on this point, with 
the intention of challenging the powerful ‘either-or’ logic that often characterises 
conversation about the moral and theological status of nonhuman life.  I examine the 
apparent discontinuity in magisterial teaching, and then explore a structure that would 
instead show forth a deep consistency: a convergence of cosmology and theological 
anthropology, centered on a strong account of the human being as microcosm.  I suggest that 
this can resolve some of the impasses faced by environmental ethics, and that the Kantian 
distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, and the unilateral rejection of the term 
‘anthropocentrism’, obscures that convergence. 
 
I do not pretend to any kind of completeness in the following account.  I simply lay out a 
trajectory which calls for a more detailed treatment. 
 
II. Nonhuman Creation Is For Our Sake: Catholic Teaching Before Pope Francis 
 
 
II. a)  Resolute Anthropocentrism 
 
Catholic teaching in modern times has not been ambivalent on the question of whether the 
natural world calls for respect and protection, nor whether nonhuman realities are good in 
themselves.  It has consistently called for ecological responsibility, engaging with the issue 
extensively prior to the promulgation of Laudato Si’ in 2015.  However, the pre-Franciscan 
magisterium addressed the question of whether the nonhuman world and nonhuman beings 
are valuable in themselves primarily in the mode of denial.  There are a few exceptions, where 
certain magisterial comments implied the possibility of intrinsic value of nonhuman life, but 
these were undeveloped and hedged around by anthropocentric rationales.   
 
                                                          
18 I will use the terms ‘Franciscan magisterium’ and ‘pre-Franciscan magisterium’ for brevity; no reference to the 
Franciscan order is intended. 
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Catholic Social Teaching on this topic prior to Pope Francis is mostly an expansion and 
elaboration on the theme that the environment must be preserved and protected as an 
aspect of the common human good.  It could be summarised with John XXIII’s formulation in 
1961 that nature is 'to be used responsibly in the service of human life'.19  Beginning with Leo 
XIII’s Rerum Novarum, and continuing through Pius XII's Quadragesimo Anno in 1931, Catholic 
Social Teaching first considered the environment in the context of moral questions around 
property and ownership.  It was defined as a common good to be shared by all humanity: ‘the 
goods of nature... belong in common and without distinction to all human kind’.20  Pope Paul 
VI's contributions to Catholic Social Teaching expanded this theme in the direction of social 
justice more generally, considering environmental responsibility as an aspect of human 
solidarity.  He emphasised the importance of environmental welfare to human 
development.21  ‘The Bible’, he says, ‘from the first page on, teaches us that the whole of 
creation is for humanity’.22   
 
A growing interest in the environment as an aspect of the common good continued through 
the pontificates of John Paul II and Benedict XVI.  Their social encyclicals expanded this 
teaching in important ways without altering the fundamental emphasis on human welfare.23  
John Paul’s teaching on the environment was shaped by what he called 'the humanistic 
criterion' as the primary criterion for the assessment of systems of thought and programmes 
of action.  For him, 'the human person is the primary and fundamental way for the Church'.24  
He spoke specifically of GS 24.3 as ‘the personalistic norm’, ‘the beginning of the life of 
persons’, the ‘royal highway’ of Christian anthropology.25  It is in the context of this 
‘incomparable’ priority of the human person that he frames a Catholic environmental ethic: 
‘God has put [creation] at the service of his personal dignity, of his life...’ 26  
 
Benedict XVI fairly summarised Catholic Social Teaching on the environment when he defined 
environmental responsibility as stemming from ‘the centrality of the human person’ and ‘the 
promotion and sharing of the common good’.27  As Celia Deane-Drummond put it in 2012, 
                                                          
19 John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, in David O’Brien and Thomas Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought: Encyclicals 
and Documents from Pope Leo XIII to Pope Francis, Third Revised Edition (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2016): 87-134), 
para. 197. 
20 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 14-40), para. 8. 
21  Principally in Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens, in O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 280-303.  
22  Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, in O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 253-277. 
23  John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, in O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 380-423; Sollicitudo Rei 
Socialis, in O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 426-470; Benedict XVI, Caritatis in Veritate, in 
O’Brien and Shannon eds., Catholic Social Thought, 528-588.   
24 John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1979). 
25 Michael Waldstein, ‘Three Kinds of Personalism: Kant, Scheler, and John Paul II’, Forum Teologiczne 10 (2009): 
151-171, 156. 
26 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1995), paras. 2, 42. 
27 Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 2010 (http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20091208_xliii-world-day-peace.html, accessed 20th 
November 2018). 
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‘Ecology perceived as an aspect of other social injustices perhaps marks out the distinctive 
contribution of Catholic Social Teaching.’28 
 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church unambiguously expresses an anthropocentric rationale 
for our responsibility towards the nonhuman world.  ‘God’, it says, ‘created everything for 
man.’29  ‘Animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the common 
good of past, present, and future humanity.’30  Aware of the need to safeguard against the 
abuse of nonhuman creatures, the Catechism bases our environmental responsibility on the 
obligation to promote human wellbeing.  ‘Man's dominion over inanimate and other living 
beings granted by the Creator is not absolute; it is limited by concern for the quality of life of 
his neighbour, including generations to come.’31  Perhaps the most succinct application of this 
kind of thinking is the Catechism’s only explicit directive regarding ethical action towards 
animate nonhuman creatures:  ‘To cause animals to suffer or die needlessly is contrary to 
human dignity’.32   It is because of what human beings are that we are to act in particular ways 
towards nonhuman creation, not because of what nonhuman creatures (animate or 
inanimate) are in themselves.  
 
The notion of 'life', as in 'sanctity of life', 'openness to life', 'culture of life', etc. has for some 
time been central to Catholic moral rhetoric.  Prior to Pope Francis the term was practically 
univocal in reference to human life.  Benedict XVI introduced an important new note by 
arguing that human ecology and environmental ecology cannot be separated.  His pontificate 
moved Catholic Social Teaching more decisively towards an integration of all life issues, linking 
concerns about human sexuality, bioscience, social justice and the environment.  But the 
integration of life issues that Benedict XVI pursues underlines the point that there is here no 
discernible concern for nonhuman life per se.  Environmental responsibilities are explained 
and expanded in such a way as to exclude a regard of nonhuman life as having its own ‘sake’.   
 
II. b)  Anthropocentrism Qualified 
 
Catholic teaching prior to the pontificate of Pope Francis recognised the danger of 
subordinating the nonhuman world to human purposes, and moved to de-legitimate 
exploitative use of the teaching.  Human supremacy over creation is not a license to abuse it 
and, in fact, underlines our responsibility for it.33  ‘[T]he true meaning of God’s original 
                                                          
28  Celia Deane-Drummond, ‘Joining in the Dance: Catholic Social Teaching and Ecology’, New Blackfriars 93 
(2012): 193-212, 197, italics added. 
29 Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 358. 
30   Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 2415. 
31   Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 2415. 
32   Catechism of the Catholic Church, para. 2418. 
33 Benedict XVI, Caritatis in Veritate (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2009), para. 50 
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command, as the Book of Genesis clearly shows, was not a simple conferral of authority, but 
rather a summons to responsibility.’34  
 
In the magisteria of John Paul II and Benedict XVI, there are three linked ways in which 
anthropocentrism is practically qualified: through a notion of stewardship, where human 
beings are given the responsibility to guard and keep the material creation for their own 
development and flourishing; through a notion of gift, where creation is viewed as an 
expression of God's benevolence and providential care; and through the notion of the 
integrity of creation, in which creation's own inbuilt order is invoked as containing principles 
of responsible use.  Environmental responsibility has two moral objects: other human beings, 
who share in creation and for whose common good it is given; and God, who has bestowed 
an order on creation, whose gift creation is and who is disrespected if its integrity is violated.   
 
At this point it is useful to advert to three apparently contraindicating texts, in which the pre-
Franciscan magisterium used the suggestive vocabulary of a human responsibility ‘towards’ 
the environment; a human ‘covenant’ with creation; and a human ‘fraternity’ with creation. 
 
Benedict XVI’s ‘Message for the World Day of Peace’ 2010 opens one paragraph with the 
heading 'The Church has a responsibility towards creation'. It explains: ‘[the Church] considers 
it her duty to exercise that responsibility [towards creation] in public life, in order to protect 
earth, water and air as gifts of God the Creator meant for everyone, and above all to save 
mankind from the danger of self-destruction.’  But he immediately clarifies that this 
responsibility takes its force from the value of the human person.  ‘Our duties towards the 
environment flow from our duties towards the person, considered both individually and in 
relation to others’.35  Our 'responsibility toward creation' is for the sake of human beings.  
 
In his Message for the World Day of Peace two years earlier, Benedict XVI referred to 'that 
covenant between human beings and the environment, which should mirror the creative love 
of God'.36  He gave this expression greater authority and permanence by repeating it in his 
encyclical letter Caritatis in Veritate.37  In both texts this covenant is connected with the truth 
‘that we all come from God and that we are all journeying towards him'.  Benedict XVI seems 
to indicate that the source of this covenant with the nonhuman world is our common origin 
in God.  John Paul II alludes to the same idea in a reference to human 'fraternity' with the 
natural world.  Human beings must ‘rediscover our fraternity with the earth, to which we have 
                                                          
34 Benedict XVI, Message for World Day of Peace 2010, para. 6. 
35 Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 2010, para. 12, italics added. 
36 Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 2008 (http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_ben-xvi_mes_20071208_xli-world-day-peace.html, accessed 20th 
November 2018), para. 7. 
37 Benedict XVI, Caritatis in Veritate para. 50.  It’s also repeated in the General Audience of 26th August 2008 
(http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/audiences/2009/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20090826.html, 
accessed 20th November 2018). 
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been linked since creation’.38 This may be the closest that the pre-Franciscan magisterium 
comes towards the language of Laudato Si’, in which a language of fraternity is enjoined upon 
believers (11). 39  But John Paul II locates his comments about the fraternity of the material 
creation in relation to the land's service of human beings.40 Benedict XVI subordinates the 
notion of a covenant with creation, stemming from the common origin of human and 
nonhuman creation in God, to creation's role as an instrument of social justice and human 
flourishing.41  Nonhuman is not recognised as having a ‘sake’ of its own; its value, such as it 
is, never becomes a rationale for ecological responsibility in its own right.   
 
While these specifications exclude abusive uses of anthropocentric understandings, the 
underlying model of value is unchanged.  We are required to protect creation for the sake of 
our neighbour; and, because creation exhibits an order bestowed upon it by God, it requires 
a ‘religious respect’, i.e. a respect based on our reverence of the Creator.  These rationales 
invoke traditionally accepted axiological sources and objects: God, human beings, and the 
natural law.  Surveying papal attempts to articulate an ethic of environmental responsibility 
in 2013, John O’Keefe was correct to argue that ‘[t]he admonition that humans not abuse the 
dominion they have been given does nothing to challenge the anthropocentric category of 
dominion itself’.42  Human life is the centre and meaning of life on earth and is the only real 
rationale, beside God, for ecological responsibility.  Our responsibility towards the nonhuman 
creation just is our responsibility to human beings for whom the creation is made and to 
whom it is wholly given.43    
 
In all this, the logic of GS 24.3 is neatly carried through.  ‘Man is the only creature on earth 
God willed for its own sake’; and so it is natural that ‘all things on earth should be related to 
man as their centre and crown’.44  To frame this in terms of the Kantian distinction, which so 
pervades contemporary ethics in this field: ‘[i]nherent value’, says one definition, ‘is to have 
value in and of oneself.  It is to be contrasted with instrumental value, in which a thing's value 
                                                          
38 He continues: ‘This very goal was foreshadowed by the Old Testament in the Hebrew Jubilee, when the earth 
rested and man gathered what the land spontaneously offered (cf. Lev. 25:11-12).  If nature is not violated and 
humiliated, it returns to being the sister of humanity.’  John Paul II, General Audience, 26th January 2000 
(https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/2000/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_20000126.html, 
accessed 20th November 2018), para. 5. 
39 References to Laudato Si’ will appear in the main text; numbers refer to paragraphs. 
40 ‘[John Paul II] did not move on from a nuanced anthropocentric view to adopt the kind of earth-centred or 
creation-centred approach that many theologians have now come to recognize as the way forward for Christian 
theology today.’  Donald Dorr, ‘Themes and Theologies in Catholic Social Teaching over Fifty years’, New 
Blackfriars 93 (2012): 137-54, 143. 
41 Benedict remains firmly committed ‘to historical anthropocentric language, even as he sounds increasingly 
urgent ecological warnings’.  O’Keefe, ‘Anthropocentrism’, 89. 
42 ‘Even though it is clear that since the 1990s [the magisterium] has become increasingly aware of the need for 
the Church to engage ecological issues, the Pope and the bishops have consistently remained staunch 
defenders of traditional anthropocentric language.’   O’Keefe, ‘Anthropocentrism’, 89. 
43 There may of course have been circumstantial reasons for this emphasis, as Dorr (2012) recognises.   
44 Gaudium et Spes para. 12 (http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html , accessed 1st July 2019). 
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is a function of how it might be used by others or what it might mean to others’.45  If intrinsic 
value ‘is to have value independent of the interests, needs, or uses of anyone else’, then this 
is denied to nonhuman life, and maintained exclusively of human life.   
 
 
III. Seeking Continuity in the Tradition 
 
 
III. a) Laudato Si’ and the Development of the Tradition 
 
Laudato Si’ marks a change in this trajectory.46  It stresses the value of nonhuman creation 
not just in relation to ‘man’s use’, but in itself.  Anthropocentrism is referred to only in critical 
terms.  Francis not only refers to nonhuman creation as having ‘intrinsic value’ (140), but also 
‘intrinsic dignity’ (115), a conspicuous move given the loaded connotations of that term―and 
particularly in light of Benedict XVI’s pejorative view of its application to nonhuman 
creatures.47  We are admonished to ‘cherish’ all creatures ‘with love and respect’, as God does 
(42).  The opening paragraphs invite a regard of the earth as a moral subject: ‘the earth 
herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of our poor’ 
(2).  Here creation is personalised in a way which implicitly challenges the exclusive attribution 
of personal quality to human life.  The earth has a ‘cry’, an articulate voice, which is one with 
the cry of the human poor (49). 
 
The document presents a radically inclusive eschatology.  Quoting Bonaventure, Francis 
speaks of a ‘universal reconciliation with every creature’ (66).  It is the destiny of ‘every 
creature’ to be ‘resplendently transfigured’ in Christ (243).  Contrasting with the generally 
univocal uses of the term ‘life’ in Catholic Social Teaching, Pope Francis asserts: ‘The Spirit of 
life dwells in every living creature’ (88).  
  
The repetition of the term ‘communion’ to describe the relationship between humanity and 
the rest of creation gives new weight to a word which has become pivotal in twentieth-
century Catholic theology.  Francis calls believers to cultivate a communion not just with God 
and human beings, but with the earth and its creatures, for we are called together into ‘a 
sublime communion’ (89), ‘a splendid universal communion’ (220).  ‘When our hearts are 
authentically open to universal communion, this sense of fraternity excludes nothing and no 
one (92).’  The phrase ‘universal communion’, applied to all creatures, appears four times in 
the document (76, 92, 220, V.).   
 
                                                          
45 Joseph DesJardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Boston: Wadsworth, 
2013), 113. 
46 References to Laudato Si’ will appear in the main text; numbers refer to paragraphs. 
47  Benedict XVI, Message for the World Day of Peace 2010, para. 13. 
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There is also an insistent repetition of a language of ‘fraternity’.  For Laudato Si’, creation is 
in the most literal sense ‘a universal family’ (89), a ‘universal fraternity’ (228).  God has a 
father’s love for every creature; every individual life, the object of his tenderness, is a brother 
or sister to humanity (77).  In contrast to John Paul II’s usage, Francis’ employment of the 
term generates a kind of parity between the human and nonhuman, who share a source and 
end, who are together on a journey to the Father (243, 244).  We are ‘joined by bonds of 
affection’ to all the world’s creatures (11; cf. 89).  In the Catechism, by contrast, ‘affection’ is 
the term used to describe what should not be offered to animals.48   
 
Francis displays a certain ambivalence about the trajectory of the teaching which preceded 
him on this issue.  He sees that he is taking a new tack, adverting to a departure from previous 
teaching (69), while at the same time taking pains to stress an overall continuity.49  How can 
we make sense of the combination of a dramatic shift of emphasis with the characteristic 
claim to magisterial consistency?   
 
We might argue that the change is simply tonal.  Pope Francis’ extension of personal language 
to the rest of creation―fraternity with all creatures, universal communion, the earth as our 
mother―may be intended to have not a philosophical but a hortatory function.  Similarly, his 
disdain for ‘anthropocentricism’ might be less a theological departure from his predecessors 
and more of a difference in rhetorical style.  Whilst, say, the Catechism or John Paul II would 
use language of personality in quite strictly defined philosophical ways, perhaps we should 
take Francis as using such language more poetically and pastorally.50  
 
This position is attractive for its prompt resolution of any appearance of strain in the 
development of the tradition.  But it is objectionable on a number of counts.  Firstly, Laudato 
Si’ is not an apostolic exhortation, but an encyclical letter.  It is a teaching document, in which 
a Pope exercises the full authority of the ordinary magisterium.  Secondly, a dichotomy of 
‘pastoral’ and ‘theological/normative’ perpetuates a dualism of doctrine and practice, a 
dualism which Francis’ pontificate as a whole persistently challenges.  Such a dualism services 
a wider rhetoric of suspicion seeking to frame Francis’ pontificate as empty of real intellectual 
                                                          
48  Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2418. 
49 Laudato Si’ justifies key claims with reference to the Catechism eight times; references no less than 18 teaching 
documents from bishops’ conferences around the world; and extensively cites John Paul II and Benedict XVI.   
In a clear claim for continuity in its key critique of anthropocentrism―and no doubt in anticipation of 
controversy―Benedict XVI is quoted as lamenting the misuse of creation which ‘begins when we no longer 
recognize any higher instance than ourselves, when we see nothing else but ourselves’ (Laudato Si’, para. 6, 
quoting Benedict XVI, Address to the Clergy of the Diocese of Bolzano-Bressanone (6 August 2008)).  Francis 
asserts that ‘The Catechism clearly and forcefully criticizes a distorted anthropocentrism’, quoting its stipulation 
that ‘Each creature possesses its own particular goodness and perfection… Each of the various creatures, willed 
in its own being, reflects in its own way a ray of God’s infinite wisdom and goodness.  Man must therefore 
respect the particular goodness of every creature, to avoid any disordered use of things’ (Laudato Si’, para. 69, 
quoting Catechism of the Catholic Church, 339). 
50 Thanks to Francis Stewart raising this question. 
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content, which has received coherent challenge in recent work.51  Thirdly and perhaps most 
importantly, Laudato Si’ moves to block such an interpretation.  The language of fraternity, 
which underwrites all our obligations towards the nonhuman world, is enjoined precisely not 
as stylistic or sentimental, but as a humble conformity to objective reality: that we share with 
nonhuman creatures a common origin in God.52 
 
If Laudato Si’s language about the natural world is not to be explained away but taken at face 
value, where can we locate the consistency of the magisterial tradition?  John Paul II saw GS 
24.3 as presenting ‘a specific kind of anthropocentrism’,53 a specification which invites a closer 
look at the way in which Laudato Si’ uses the term.  While Francis employs it only negatively, 
it is always prefaced by a qualifier.  He speaks of a distorted anthropocentrism (69); a 
misguided anthropocentrism (118, 119, 122); a tyrannical anthropocentrism (68); a modern 
anthropocentrism (115); an excessive anthropocentrism (116).  Nowhere does he reject 
anthropocentrism as such.  There is in this an implicit acknowledgement that 
anthropocentrism is not per se a negative term.  Rather than a misguided anthropocentrism, 
there could be a correct anthropocentrism; rather than a distorted anthropocentrism, a true 
anthropocentrism; rather than a tyrannical anthropocentrism, a servant anthropocentrism; 
rather than a modern or excessive anthropocentrism, an appropriate anthropocentrism 
rooted in authentic Christian tradition.  Anthropocentrism can be narrated in very different 
ways.  It is the kind of anthropocentrism that is defended which is at issue.  What would a 
‘correct’, ‘authentic’, ‘servant’ anthropocentrism be? 
 
III. b) A Non-Competitive Theological Hermeneutic in Laudato Si’ 
 
The signature theological motif of Laudato Si’, beyond its foregrounding of traditional 
theological data such as the doctrines of creation and Trinity, is its refusal of the negative 
contrast between human and nonhuman.  Prior Catholic teaching usually stated the contrast 
in derogatory terms: the nonhuman provided negative traction to generate the exclusive 
value of the human.  In this it was typical in a Western tradition which routinely framed the 
significance of ‘man’ by reference to his not being like the lowly beasts.   Seen against this 
background, Laudato Si’s ‘innovation’, if we might call it that, is to see a competitive contrast 
between human and nonhuman as a false contrast.  We either value both, or we value 
neither.  Pope Francis’ refusal to accept the designation of Laudato Si’ as an ‘environmental 
                                                          
51 See particularly Massimo Borghesi, The Mind of Pope Francis: Jorge Mario Bergoglio’s Intellectual Journey, 
trans. Barry Hudock (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2018). 
52 ‘Saint Bonaventure tells us that, “from a reflection on the primary source of all things, filled with even more 
abundant piety, [St. Francis] would call creatures, no matter how small, by the name of ‘brother’ or ‘sister’”… 
This cannot be written off as a naïve romanticism’ (Laudato Si’, 11, italics added).  In this key text Francis indicates 
how he wishes the Encyclical’s title to be read: as a recognition that Francis’ Canticle of the Creatures possesses 
a theological authority; and that the language of fraternity is above all a necessary reflection of theological truth. 
53 John Paul II, Sources of Renewal: The Fulfilment of Vatican II (London: Harper & Row, 1980), 75. 
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encyclical’ is significant in this regard.  Rather, he said, it is a ‘social encyclical’.54  There cannot 
be a simple externality between the human and the natural. 
 
For Laudato Si’, an authentic anthropocentrism rooted in the tradition rightly understood―a 
tradition outlined in Chapter 2’s theology of creation―would be one which is so formulated 
that the good of all creatures and the human good cannot authentically be stated in 
competitive terms.  This non-competitive hermeneutic is most clearly expressed in a 
somewhat neglected feature of the document: the theological teleology which governs the 
shape and content of the letter.   
 
Some commentators see Laudato Si’ as lacking a historical teleology.  One claims that the 
document contains no ‘arrow of time’;55 another that it entirely rejects narratives of 
progress.56    There is certainly a critique of utilitarian and utopian conceptions of progress in 
the document.  But it does contain an ‘arrow of time’, and far from denying ‘progress’ per se, 
it questions construals of ‘moving forward’ which frame that movement in terms other than 
the theological teleology of history.  The text is governed by vector terms which indicate the 
common destiny of all creatures in God.  We are all ‘moving forward… towards a common 
point of arrival, which is God’ (83).  ‘In union with all creatures, we journey through this land 
seeking God’ (244).  Indeed, the text reframes its eponymous subject, ‘our common home’, 
in terms of that teleology.  ‘Even now we are journeying towards the sabbath of eternity, the 
new Jerusalem, towards our common home in heaven’ (243).  ‘Creatures tend towards God’ 
(240), and so the teleology is radically non-competitive.  All have the same end.  This 
generates a true and not merely sentimental fraternity, an impossibility of separating the 
good of one from the good of another.   
 
This is borne out by a related aspect of the encyclical’s contribution to the tradition: its 
development of the meaning and scope of key terms of Catholic Social Teaching.  This begins 
with the concept, fundamental to the social teaching tradition, of common―for now 
‘common good’ emphatically includes the good of all creatures.  This change in the application 
                                                          
54 Reported in e.g. Paul Vallely, ‘The Pope’s Ecological Vow’, The New York Times (28th June 2015).  The 
inseparability of the social and the ecological is at the heart of the concept of ‘integral ecology’ which captures 
the insistent holism of Catholic Social Teaching on the environment, its insistent option for both-and and its 
refusal of either-or.  See Vincent Miller, ‘Integral Ecology: Francis's Moral and Spiritual Vision of 
Interconnectedness’, in Vincent Miller ed., The Theological and Ecological Vision of Laudato Si’: Everything is 
Connected (London: T&T Clark, 2017), 11-28. 
55 Wolfgang Sachs, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals and Laudato si’: varieties of Post-Development?’, Third  
World Quarterly (2017), 8. ‘[T]he chronopolitics of development are conspicuously absent from the encyclical…  
Progress, and other promises for the future, are non-existent in the document and one gets the impression that 
the arrow of time that has shaped historical perception for two centuries has simply been done away with… in 
Laudato Si’ the rejection of the arrow of time is… extreme.’  Puzzlingly, Sachs describes the encyclical as 
‘decidedly space focused’; it ‘replaces the arrow of time with spatial consciousness’.  The theological teleology 
we are describing here testifies against this judgement.  
56 R. R. Reno, ‘The Return of Catholic Anti-Modernism’, First Things 18th June 2015.  Reno describes Laudato Si’ 
as ‘anti-progressive’, the most anti-modern encyclical since the Syllabus of Errors.   
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of the term is at the heart of the document’s purpose.  Its title sets forth that challenge 
implicitly: ‘common’ is no longer to be defined in an exclusionary way, for the ‘us’ of Our 
Common Home is not just humanity, but all creatures who share this home with us. Other 
pivotal terms are expanded in their scope to non-competitively include nonhuman alongside 
human creatures.  The moral purchase of concepts of poverty, marginalisation and suffering 
is no longer exclusive to human subjects, for the earth is one of the poor and her cry is heard 
alongside the cries of the human poor.  Notions of ‘salvation’ and ‘redemption’ are repeatedly 
applied to all creatures, whose destiny is to be transfigured in Christ.  We share not only this 
home with all other creatures, but also the renewed earth of the eschaton, where ‘each 
creature, resplendently transfigured, will take its rightful place’ (243).  As though flagrantly 
refusing the contest between this vision and the tradition’s emphasis on the creation’s service 
of human beings, the feature of this ‘resplendent transfiguration’ Francis chooses to advert 
to at the conclusive point of the letter is that finally, at the eschaton, each creature ‘will have 
something to give to those poor men and women who will have been liberated once and for 
all’ (243).  The goods of the human and the nonhuman are once again not contrasted but 
united. 
 
The precise point of discontinuity, then, between Pope Francis and the teaching of his 
predecessors is that the assertion of human value then came in a framework of implied 
competition between human and nonhuman.  Laudato Si’, in contrast, refuses to set human 
and nonhuman over against each other.  This non-competitive hermeneutic exposes the 
condition that is required for Laudato Si’ to be consistent with the apparently opposed 
formulation of Gaudium et Spes.  GS 24.3 can be true only if ‘man’ in some way contains within 
himself the sakes of all creatures.  Not so as to replace, exclude or supersede them, but 
precisely as the way in which their good is attained.  Francis adopts this position when he 
describes creation’s telos as being through and with human beings to reach God: ‘All creation 
is journeying with us and through us towards a common point of arrival, which is God’ (83).   
 
On such a view, the ‘sakes’ of creatures simply could not, logically, come into competition, for 
all have one and the same ‘sake’, one and the same end.  The human distinctive is to be the 
means and, in a very comprehensive sense, the actual context in which that end is attained.  
The sakes of creatures are not related as slices of pie in a pie-chart, where what space one 
takes another has to give.  This is a zero-sum game in which, where one wins, another must 
lose.  (In GS 24.3, this model means that the human must take all.)  Rather, the relation is 
more like the way the strengths of different horses become, through the agency of the driver 
of a cart, a coherent team which pulls together towards a goal.  It is the presence and 
persistence of the driver which gathers and directs the team in such a way that they travel in 
one direction together, a single vector with a common momentum. 
 
Reading Gaudium et Spes and Laudato Si’ side-by-side draws us in this kind of direction.  It 
clarifies, contra anxious critics, that Francis’ personalising language about the earth and 
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nonhuman creatures is very different from affording the status of person to particular 
nonhuman animals.  Francis’ personalising of the earth does not contradict the idea that ‘man’ 
is the creature in whom the cosmos takes on its true meaning.  On the contrary; it suggests 
that the centrality of the human person in the order of creation is constituted by this 
gathering up of the sakes of creatures.  GS 24.3 is consistent with Laudato Si’’s priority of non-
competition with respect to the human and the nonhuman only on this condition: if the 
human good, the human sake, actually contains the ‘sake’ of all creation.  There is no trumping 
of the nonhuman with the human.  There is no negative traction in the framing of the human 
priority.  Rather the human priority is seen to contain, express, carry―to actually be―the 
good of all creatures.   
 
IV.c) The Human Being As Microcosm 
 
What would make this true?   Only if the human being in some way recapitulates in her own 
person the whole of creation; which is to say, only if human beings are true microcosms.   
 
Man is in some way the compendium of all the worlds.  ‘For he has esse in 
common with stones, living in common with trees, sensing in common with 
animals, and understanding in common with angels. If man, therefore, has 
something in common with all creatures, then in a sense man is every creature.’  
For this reason man is called a microcosm, a small world…57  
 
On this view, the human person sums up, is co-extensive with, the whole, in such a way that 
the constitution of human beings can be seen to be wholly overlapping with that of the 
cosmos itself.  The origins of GS 24.3 exhibit the influence of this thinking.  The text derives 
from Summa Contra Gentiles, in which Aquinas explains why rational creatures alone are 
made for their own sake. ‘Now, intellectual natures have a closer relationship to a whole than 
do other natures’, says Thomas; ‘indeed, each intellectual substance is, in a way 
[quodammodo], all things.’58   Here he is leaning on Aristotle, who says that ‘the soul is in a 
way all things’.59  Aristotle’s use of the concept is primarily epistemological; the soul’s 
identification with all things is through its knowing of all things.  To explore the extent to 
which Aquinas pushes this insight beyond Aristotle’s usage towards an ontological purchase 
for this quodammodo would take us beyond the scope of this paper.  It is sufficient for the 
present argument to point out that the reconciliation between the ‘sakes’ of human and 
nonhuman creatures is not foreign to the intellectual substrate of GS 24.3.    
 
                                                          
57 Edouard Hugon, Cosmology (Germany: Editiones Scholasticae, 2013), 28-29, quoting Gregory the Great, italics 
added.  This is ‘[f]or the sake of beauty’, for ‘it is fitting that there be a certain world that is a sort of compendium 
or recapitulation of others’.   
58 Book 3 chap. 112 section 5 (https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm, accessed 1st July 2019). 
59 De Anima 3.8 (http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.3.iii.html, accessed 1st July). 
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The philosophy and theology of ‘man as microcosm’ extends, of course, well beyond Aquinas.  
While a lengthier exposition would be required to illuminate in full its application to the 
problem at hand,60 a brief observation of some of features of its use in the tradition indicates 
its salience to concerns about the applicability of ‘anthropocentrism’.  Probably the most 
significant expositor is Maximus the Confessor, whose treatment of the theme specifies it in 
terms not of epistemology, but of ontology and Christology.61   
 
Maximus’ theological anthropology stresses an analogy between the human being as ‘little 
world’, microcosmos, and the cosmos as an ‘enlarged humanity’, macanthropos.  This analogy 
indicates an ontological solidarity and co-inherence.  The human being is a microcosm by 
virtue of her ontological constitution as containing all the elements of the created order, 
spiritual and material, and also by virtue of being made in the image of God, who is Christ the 
Logos, through whom and in whom are all things.62  The human place in the order of creation 
is Christological in shape.  The Maximian approach is particularly apt to the problem at hand 
because for Maximus the human being’s character as a microcosm is connected to the human 
task, which is a task of mediation.  The human being is ‘the bond of unity’, who draws into a 
unity the multiplicity of created things without extinguishing their difference.  Humanity’s 
task of mediation is cosmic in scope.  In its performance, all the divisions of creation are 
reconciled.63   
 
                                                          
60 Maximus’ theological anthropology has drawn a good deal of attention in the context of ecological and 
environmental questions.  For an authoritative example see Elizabeth Theokritoff, ‘The Salvation of the World 
and Saving the Earth: an Orthodox Christian Approach’, Worldviews 14 (2010): 141-156.  Theokritoff places the 
Maximian account in strong contrast with Protestant (referencing Ernst Conradie) and Catholic (referencing Willis 
Jenkins) approaches.  The present treatment hopes to show that the Catholic tradition is not only hospitable to 
a Maximian account, but directly begs such a model. 
61 Hugon’s scholastic exposition employs the Christological dimension to somewhat different effect; in his 
account, Christ is microcosm in a way that is structurally unique.  ‘There would need to be some world that is 
both body and God, man and God, spirit and God.  Now, that world is not only an ideal, but a reality: Jesus Christ.  
In Him, as the Apostle testifies, God renewed all things, or as the Greek text has it, God made a recapitulation of 
all things.  He first recapitulated the material world. The human body is the ideal among inferior bodies; but the 
exemplar of the human body is the body of Jesus Christ.  In the body of his Son, therefore, God renewed all 
things.  Now, in the soul of Christ are recapitulated both the human world and the angelic world: for his most 
holy Soul has all the perfections of all men and gathers within itself greater knowledge and grace than all the 
angels together.  In Christ, therefore, the three worlds are summarized; they are, in fact, joined together with 
the divine and archetypal world itself, and form one world with it through the hypostatic union.  For, in Christ, 
Divinity, soul, and body subsist in one Person.  Christ, therefore, is the most perfect world, in which all the worlds 
are made one—one, that is, in the Person’  (Hugon, Cosmology, 28-9). Hugon’s approach is less salient to the 
argument pursued here, which depends on the attribution of microcosmic status in a real sense to the human 
being per se. 
62  Lars Thunberg notes that Maximus’ treatment of the term seeks to reconcile the tension between these two 
aspects of the theology of ‘man as microcosm’ as he inherits it from the Greeks via the Cappadocians (Thunberg, 
Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 
137).  See Thunberg, Microcosm, 132-42, for an overview of Maximus’ approach to the term. 
63 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 41, PG 91: 1308C-1312B; see also Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor 
(London: Routledge, 1996), 72-4. 
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The connection between the status of the human as microcosm, the task that this implies, 
and the consequent orientation of creation towards the human, is clarified particularly by 
Nemesius, a key intellectual predecessor to Maximus.  For Nemesius ‘man’s divine task [is]… 
to act as a microcosm’; it is ‘[f]or this reason he has been placed at the centre of the 
universe’.64  The character of the human being explicates the nature and destiny of the 
cosmos; the argument is made from human being to world, rather than the reverse.  It is the 
nature of the human that gives the clue, as it were, to the nature of the whole.  Importantly, 
this leads Nemesius to claim that nonhuman creatures ‘exist for man’s sake’.65  It is in light of 
the human that the meaning of creation comes into view.  Here we see the theological 
tradition represented by GS 24.3 being used in such a way as to order the centrality of the 
human person in creation towards the good of the cosmos as a whole.  The distinctive place 
of the human does not come at the expense of the rest of creation, but rather is the means 
of creation’s movement towards the unity and harmony to which God calls it.   
 
By constitution and by calling, then, human beings are at the cosmic scale.  This is the most 
important reason (among a number of others) to question those who take science’s discovery 
of the vast physical size of the created universe as a rationale for opposing the Church’s 
traditional anthropocentrism.  ‘Given what we know about the size of the universe, its 
expansive character, and given the possibility that there may in fact be a multiverse… the idea 
that creation exists entirely for humans is highly implausible, even silly.’66  The objection is 
misconceived, for it is not size, power or ratio that makes the human being central, but 
ontology.  Creation is for human beings not in a limitedly utilitarian sense, but in the sense of 
an ontological ordering: the universe is toward something, is gathered up in something, gains 
its perfection by something; and that something is Christ and, in their participation in Christ 
and their constitution as creatures both spiritual and material, human beings.  To deny 
anthropocentrism at the cosmological level is thus a curious kind of physicalism, in which the 
invisible order in which the human being participates is occluded.  Further, the denial of 
anthropocentrism in the absolute sense arguably commits one, ipso facto, to subscribe to a 
merely local Christocentrism.67 
 
To return to GS 24.3 and Laudato Si’: placing the texts in this tradition harmonises them.  If 
‘[man] was brought into being as an all-containing workshop, binding all together in 
                                                          
64 Thunberg, Microcosm, 136, italics added. 
65 Thunberg, Microcosm, 137, italics added. 
66  O’Keefe, ‘Anthropocentrism’, 91.  He continues: ‘If the cosmos―the sum total of reality―is infinite, or an 
infinity of finitudes, as it seems to many scientific observers, then traditional anthropocentric readings of Genesis 
are even more removed from what we know from other areas of human inquiry. Even if we limit the cosmic 
scope of the claim and say that the earth, but not the rest of the universe, was created for humans, the 
implausibility asserts itself. Were the dinosaurs really created for us? What about those strange worms that live 
around volcanic shoots at the bottom of the ocean? Were they also created for humans?’ 
67 ‘Only an understanding of man as the centre of the created universe does justice to the cosmic implications 
of Christ’s position and work of reconciliation’ (Thunberg, Microcosm, 142). 
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himself’,68 then there is no contradiction in asserting simultaneously that human beings are 
the only creatures God willed for their own sake, and that every creature has a ‘sake’ of its 
own.  It is simply that the latter can only be coherently read within the former.  John Paul II’s 
cherished ‘humanistic criterion’ is then not only respected but ontologically embedded.  But 
crucially, rather than this criterion coming at the expense of other creatures, it appears as a 
service to those creatures’ destiny. This has significant consequences for the way in which we 
frame ‘value’ in the nonhuman world.   
 
If John Paul II saw GS 24.3 as presenting ‘a specific kind of anthropocentrism’,69 it is the kind 
of anthropocentrism the magisterium articulates that Laudato Si’ modulates.  In light of 
Laudato Si’, we might charge GS 24.3 with being misleading by omission.  Its formula neglects 
to state that this ‘only’ is the most inclusive ‘only’ there can be.  The salvific role of the human 
being in creation is by analogy to God and by means of the ‘fixity’ of the divine image in the 
human being.70  Misleading by omission it may be, but GS 24.3 seems ‘primed’ for such a 
reading.  ‘This [divine] likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God 
willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.’  To be for 
one’s own sake is to be for the sake of others.  Being ‘the only creature God willed for its own 
sake’ just is to exist for something other than oneself; to have a vector in one’s being, a vector 
towards self-gift.  The apparently exclusive structure of the claim thus turns out to be oriented 
toward a radical inclusion, a laying-open of the self.  Reading GS 24.3 in light of Laudato Si’, 
this self-gift is now seen to be integrally linked to the human service of creation’s end.  In our 
likeness to God converge our orientation to self-gift with our vocation to serve the 
transcendent destiny of all creatures.  In this self-gift alone, now seen in cosmic perspective, 
the human being ‘finds himself’. 
 
The ‘only’ of GS 24.3 must therefore be taken by analogy with the ‘only’ of God, which is 
radically inclusive with respect to creation.  To be for one’s own sake is to resemble God.  All 
that is exists ‘for God’s sake’, but this is no denigration of the all; on the contrary, it is the only 
way in which creation could exist.  Existing for God’s sake is the ground of creation’s worth 
and dignity. This inclusivity is apparent if we articulate the good of nonhuman creatures in 
the terms of the human good―which is really their good―and vice-versa, for both converge 
in God.71   When this is neglected, the good of the human is made to come at the expense of 
                                                          
68 Thunberg, Microcosm, 139.  An important contemporary representative of this tradition is Dumitru Staniloae.  
See Charles Miller, The Gift of the World: An Introduction to the Theology of Dumitru Staniloae (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2000), 30-1.  
69 John Paul II, Sources of Renewal: The Fulfilment of Vatican II (New York: Harper Collins, 1980), 75. 
70 A view common to Maximus and the Cappadocians (Thunberg, Microcosm, 135, 138). 
71 Laudato Si’ moves easily from the affirmation of human uniqueness to the solidarity of the natural order.  Pope 
Francis defends the incomparable value of the human (‘This is not to put all living beings on the same level nor 
to deprive human beings of their unique worth and the tremendous responsibility it entails’ (90)) immediately 
after observing the deepest human solidarity with the earth―solidarity in suffering (‘God has joined us so closely 
to the world around us that we can feel the desertification of the soil almost as a physical ailment, and the 
extinction of a species as a painful disfigurement’ (89)). 
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the non-human; or, from the other direction, the good of the nonhuman is made to come at 
the expense of the human.  John Paul II points towards such an interpretation when he 
observes that the anthropocentrism of Gaudium et Spes is in fact a Christocentrism.72  This 
requires an account of the human being as microcosm, for Christ is the true and final 
microcosm, the first-born of all creation in whom all things hold together.   
 
This brief argument can be summarised as a proposal that the integration of the pre- and 
post-Franciscan magisterium on this issue depends on the convergence of cosmology and 
theological anthropology.  Such a convergence is suggestive of two further developments. 
 
Firstly, it emboldens us to recover the analogy between the role of God and the role of human 
beings in creation.  This is a controversial recovery because it points back to the ‘dominion’ 
of Genesis which many are anxious to leave behind, even when parsed in terms of the sort of 
dominion God exercises over creation.  But it need not be a pernicious analogy, if correctly 
understood.  Analogy is not identity, but simultaneous similarity-in-difference.   For Maximus, 
this analogy ‘never violates the basic principle of the gulf between Creator and creation’, for 
creation’s movement towards unity comes about ‘according to one simple and immutable 
principle’, which is the creation of all creatures from nothing.73  The point of the analogy is 
not to insulate the human from the extra-human, but to generate an axiomatic resistance to 
seeing the good of nonhuman and human creatures as external to one another.  It is a setting 
apart of the human so as to stress the way in which the human embraces and gathers up all 
creatures.  It follows the principle of ‘distinguish in order to unite’. 
 
The contrast between ‘stewardship’ and ‘priesthood’ as normative framings of the human 
role in creation comes into view here.74   This sort of reasoning suggests an important deficit 
in the former model. ‘Stewardship’ remains extrinsic in picturing the human relation to the 
world as obtaining primarily ‘outside’ of ourselves.  In a model of ‘priesthood’, in contrast, 
human beings represent God to the world and the world to God, because of their ontological 
constitution.  They stand as ‘little Christs’ in the created order, bringing creation to fulfilment. 
‘The human being is related to nature not functionally, as the idea of stewardship would 
                                                          
72 John Paul II, Sources of Renewal, 75. 
73 Thunberg, Microcosm, 139. 
74 For a defence of ‘priesthood’ over ‘stewardship’, see John Zizioulas, ‘Proprietors or Priests of Creation?’ 
(http://www.orth-transfiguration.org/proprietors-or-priests-of-creation/, accessed 25th February 2019).  Also 
John Zizioulas, 'Priest of Creation', in R.J. Berry ed., Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and 
Present (London: T&T Clark, 2006): 273-290.  Zizioulas argues that ‘stewardship’ has managerialist overtones.  In 
the terms we are discussing here, a managerialist approach is extrinsicist in its implications: nature remains 
something ‘over there’ to be looked after from without.  For a general critical exploration of stewardship models, 
see Clare Palmer, 'Stewardship: A Case Study in Environmental Ethics', in Ian Ball et al., The Earth Beneath: A 
Critical Guide to Green Theology (London: SPCK, 1992): 67-86.  A more recent treatment is Chris Southgate, 
‘Stewardship and its Competitors: A Spectrum of Relationships Between Humans and the Nonhuman Creation’, 
in R.J. Berry ed., Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and Present (London: T&T Clark, 2006): 
185-98. 
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suggest, but ontologically: by being the steward of creation the human being relates to nature 
by what he does, whereas by being the priest of creation he relates to nature by what he is.’75  
 
Secondly, the meaning of the ‘intrinsic value’ defended in Laudato Si’ is significantly affected.  
Returning to the formulation of ‘intrinsic value’ stated earlier, we can see that the notion as 
described in that definition is denied by Pope Francis.  ‘‘Intrinsic value’ is to have value 
independent of the interests, needs, or uses of anyone else.  [It] is to have value in and of 
oneself.  It is to be contrasted with instrumental value, in which a thing's value is a function 
of how it might be used by others or what it might mean to others.’76  But for Laudato Si’ read 
alongside GS 24.3, there is no value of nonhuman creation ‘independent’ of human beings, 
for there is no ‘independence’ of nonhuman from human―either practically or ontologically.  
‘Intrinsic’ indicates a sort of self-standing dignity.  In a universe in which―as Francis never 
tires of repeating―‘everything is connected’, there is no self-standing value; or rather, one 
alone is self-standing, and that is God.  And God is not outside of, or in competition with, any 
created value.  This might act as a gentle call to self-examination on the part of movements 
which celebrate Laudato Si’s proclamation of the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures.  It 
warns that ‘intrinsic value’ may be in key respects a questionable terminology for expressing 
the immense and, ultimately, eschatological meaning and dignity of the life of every creature, 
to which Pope Francis draws attention.   
 
To the extent that Laudato Si’ indicates a deficit in the pre-Franciscan magisterium, it is this: 
it presented the human and the nonhuman as in some way competing for the same space of 
value.  The impression was given that created value is a zero-sum game.  This presumption is 
at work in much of the Christian response to movements in secular animal ethics, whether it 
is by hastily embracing those movements and performing public penance for historic 
anthropocentrism, or by rejecting them out of hand because they threaten human value.  
Both responses resemble the failure of the pre-Franciscan magisterium’s neglect of the unity 
of the good of nonhuman and human creatures.  It is this that Laudato Si’ corrects. 
 
 
IV. c)  Revisiting our Terms 
 
Such an approach invites us to revisit the terms we use in framing these issues.  Firstly, the 
term ‘non-human’ itself becomes problematic, for there would on this kind of account be 
nothing ‘nonhuman’ anywhere at all.  ‘Extra-human’, an obvious alternative, is perhaps 
worse.  If cosmology and theological anthropology converge, everything is, in a specific sense, 
                                                          
75 Zizioulas, ‘Proprietors or Priests’, italics original.  On nature’s fulfilment by means of human beings, Zizioulas 
stresses that this is for nature’s own sake: ‘nature itself stands in need of development through us in order to 
fulfil its own being and acquire a meaning which it would not otherwise have… [this is a] development which 
treats nature as an entity that must be developed for its own sake… [through] taking care of its fragility and its 
‘groaning in travail’’ (italics added). 
76 DesJardins, Environmental Ethics, 113. 
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intra-human.  The problem is that at this point we have no uncontroversial way of 
distinguishing between human and nonhuman animals that we can trade on to name them.  
One major interest that is served by the present considerations is that the proposal may save 
us from the fate of hanging our ambitions to specify human uniqueness (where that is 
understood as a difference of kind rather than merely a difference of degree) on the discovery 
of a ‘golden barrier’ between humans and other species.77  This kind of project is per se 
oriented to defining human uniqueness by identification of the absence of some specifiable 
property in nonhuman creatures.  It commits those who seek to articulate a ‘human 
difference’ to an unhappy pursuit of empirical criteria of distinction―criteria which become 
ever-more precarious the more we learn about evolutionary history and the lives of 
nonhuman species―while at the same time begging a value-question it cannot on its own 
grounds answer.78 
 
The proposal here gives a different content to the ‘human difference’, content which is 
metaphysical rather than ‘scientific’, and which has the particular advantage of stressing that 
human uniqueness is not purchased at the price of doing-down other species.79  Human 
beings are distinguished among animals by containing and recapitulating the good of all 
creatures in a way that is simply asymmetrical, i.e. is performed by no other creature 
(including, for what it’s worth, spiritual creatures such as angels); but in that very difference 
it is inclusive of all.   
 
Secondly, the term ‘use’, which since Kant is correlated to the absence of intrinsic value, needs 
to be restored to its Augustinian stature.  The unity of the pre- and post-Franciscan magisteria 
                                                          
77 Stephen Jay Gould, ‘The Human Difference’, The New York Times, 2nd July 1999 (https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1999/ 07/02/opinion/the-human-difference.html, accessed 30th November 2018).  For this reason I am 
uncomfortable with the sort of reasoning pursued by Zizioulas when he locates human priesthood in creation 
pre-eminently in human freedom (‘Proprietors or Priests’). 
78 David Abram, a notable opponent of the rhetoric of human uniqueness, clarifies the value-problem: ‘Our 
opposable thumbs, our ability to balance and ambulate on our hind legs, our capacity for reflection, and our 
slyness with tools and ever-more-complex technologies entail that we are a pretty unique bunch.  But then again, 
that hawk soaring overhead is able to fly without any of the contrivances that we depend upon, and the apple 
tree over there is able to squeeze apples directly out of its limbs, which in itself is pretty damn unique, and a far 
cry from anything that I can muster with my own body.  …Perhaps you could say that the compelling stories we 
two-leggeds regularly concoct could be called an efflorescence, or even a kind of fruit, like those apples.  But 
still, the way that some whales dive to a depth of six thousand feet, holding their breath for over ninety minutes, 
seems another kind of astonishment, as is the journey of monarch butterflies.  … Are we humans unique? Sure 
we are.  But so is everyone else around here.’  (David Abram, ‘On Being Human in a More-Than-Human World’, 
https://www.humansandnature.org/to-be-human-david-abram, accessed 30th November 2018.)   
Abram’s claim is a pertinent one.  Why is it that the sort of difference human beings possess is a qualitatively 
different sort of difference?  The present proposal addresses this question in another key.  The human difference 
includes, gathers up, creaturely differences, at an ontological level.  Making such an account credible will depend 
on underlining the connection between the human status as microcosm, and the human task as mediator and 
priest.   The human difference is a task for human beings to live up to, in failing which their ‘difference’ becomes 
a pernicious and exclusive one. 
79 This sort of approach does not entail that certain empirical features of human beings cannot be indexed to 
this unique role, simply that human uniqueness is not reducible to those properties. 
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is obscured by these Kantian overtones, overtones which would make ‘use’ and ‘intrinsic 
value’ opposed, as in the remarks above where ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ are opposed.  If 
we are going to stick with the terminology of intrinsic and instrumental value―which is now 
so embedded we probably can’t rewind the script―there needs to be an articulation of the 
compatibility, indeed the active synergy, between the two kinds of value.  This can come via 
a recovery of the Augustinian sense that to be ‘used’ is not in itself an insult to dignity, for 
only one thing cannot be used―only one thing is for-itself―and that is God.   
 
Some fears which may have arisen in the course of this enquiry could in this way be laid to 
rest.  We could safely say, for example―perhaps pacifying anxious ecotheologians―that in a 
certain sense human beings are the most ‘instrumental’ of all creatures, for it is by them that  
God fulfils his ultimate purpose, which is to bring creation to fulfilment.  We could boldly 
propose that ‘dignity’ and ‘use’, often conceived as being in inverse proportion to one 
another, are actually in direct proportion to one another.  We could say that not only is 
creation ordered towards the good of human beings, but that human beings are ordered 
towards the good of creation; by their faithful performance of their priesthood, creation 
attains its final good.  Crucially however, there is no symmetry here, and so none of that 
‘flattening’ of nature to which biotic egalitarianism gives rise.  This sort of approach would 
also contribute to applied environmental ethics.  Debates over ‘ecosystem services’ as a 
model of environmental value, for example, trade on the opposition between intrinsic and 
instrumental.  It is only in this sort of context that key magisterial claims become intelligible, 
such as John Paul II’s assertion that it ‘in the Creator’s plan, created realities, which are good 
in themselves, exist for man's use’.80   This kind of thinking prompts us to waste no further 
time worrying about whether we are to use the nonhuman creation for human 
purposes―about which we don’t, realistically, have a choice―and focus our energies on 
discerning what kinds of use are appropriate, by identifying criteria for distinguishing between 
use and abuse.81   
 
Thirdly, a care needs to be taken when the term ‘anthropocentrism’ is used per se to 
designate those cosmologies which are hostile to environmental and ecological concern.  The 
stigmatisation of the term actively promotes the zero-sum narrative, by generating the 
impression that the priority of the human necessarily implies the devaluing of the rest of the 
created order.  I have argued that the opposite is the case.  At the very least it needs to be 
noted that the term is capable of being parsed in very divergent ways.  
 
                                                          
80 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 255. (http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_ 
councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html, accessed 30th 
November 2018). 
81 The view, which occurs in but also beyond the bounds of what is now called ‘radical environmentalism’, that 
human beings are a regrettable intrusion on an otherwise harmonious natural order, simply carries the protest 
against ‘use’ to its logical conclusion. In contrast, Catholic teaching has invested a good deal of energy in 
developing criteria, generally based in natural law, for discerning principles of correct use. 
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I recognise in this context the power of compelling theological investigations of the nature 
and destiny of nonhuman life which identify ‘anthropocentrism’ as the culprit in the 
diminishment of the nonhuman.82 The trajectory laid out here is intended to support the 
momentum of such work, and it is certainly arguable that the term ‘anthropocentrism’ itself 
has become pernicious beyond rescue.  Terminology matters, and never more so than when 
powerful cultural forces need to be harnessed for good.  In seeking an alternative, however, 
on the conception defended here that term is not simply replaceable by ‘Christocentrism’ or 
‘theocentrism’.  The object of the microcosm argument is humanness as such―all human 
beings qua their humanity―not simply ‘God’ or ‘Christ’.   ‘Christocentrism’ and ‘theocentrism’ 
by themselves let us off the hook too easily.  The Christian cosmology I have defended places 
a demand of Christ-shaped mediation and servanthood upon every human qua human.  It 
foregrounds the dependency of the natural order on human holiness.  It makes it impossible 
to evade the grave responsibility that is inherited in human nature as such.  This has the 
particular advantage, in the present context of ecological crisis, of avoiding any facile accounts 
of Christian hope which evade the difficult fact that in the divine economy, humanity bears an 
ineluctable responsibility for creation’s fulfilment.  Laudato Si’ clearly indicates that this pulls 
together with, rather than coming at the cost of, the fundamental theocentrism of Christian 
cosmology.83 
 
Whatever term is used, it needs to capture the concrete implications of Christology for all 
human beings.  This kind of thinking can support and underwrite the impressive new work in 
the theological articulation of the specific dignities of nonhuman creatures by showing more 
clearly that strenuously to emphasise such dignities is in no necessary discontinuity with 
historic Christian cosmology.84 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Laudato Si’ can be interpreted consistently with Gaudium et Spes if 
contextualised in terms of the unity of cosmology and theological anthropology, focused on 
an account of the human being as microcosm.  Needless to say, our present situation makes 
it gravely urgent that the kind of project I have pursued here is specified so as to definitively 
and unambiguously exclude destructive practices towards the natural world.  A radically 
inclusive anthropocentrism, an anthropocentrism which is defined so as to include the good 
of all creatures, calls for a practice which will have as its standard God’s own inclusivity of 
creation’s good.  Our ecological ethics will then be marked by the confession both of our 
                                                          
82 E.g. Elizabeth Johnson, Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Denis 
Edwards, Jesus and the Wisdom of God (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2005). 
83 ‘All creatures are moving forward with us and through us towards a common point of arrival, which is God… 
Human beings, endowed with intelligence and love, and drawn by the fullness of Christ, are called to lead all 
creatures back to their Creator’ (83, emphasis added). 
84 In, for example, David Clough, On Animals, Vol 1: Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2014) and 
Christopher Steck’s forthcoming All God’s Animals (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2019). 
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vocation to practice this inclusivity, and of our failure to do so.  The formulation of such an 
anthropocentrism should manifest the impossibly daunting implications of the practice that 
will be entailed.  It points to an inclusivity so total that it enshrines our continual inadequacy 
to its perfect performance.   
 
This kind of reasoning provides no recompense for the lamentable reluctance of the Catholic 
magisterium to deliver an unambiguous declaration of the dignity of every creature as an 
object of God’s saving love.  The jarring discordance between the sort of sentiments 
expressed in the Catholic Dictionary of 1897 and those of Laudato Si’ remains a painful one.  
But joining the dots of magisterial teaching to show a deeper consistency in the tradition can 
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